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JUSTICE CARDOZO’S THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS:  A CASE STUDY 
Judge Kermit V. Lipez,  
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
Presented at the Cardozo Symposium at Touro Law Center 
March 23, 2017* 
INTRODUCTION 
In almost thirty-two years as a judge, state and federal, trial and 
appellate, I have written more than 1300 opinions.  Although I do not 
have the gift of some of my colleagues who remember every opinion 
that they have written, I have written some opinions that I can never 
forget.  I want to focus on one of those opinions -- a dissent that I wrote 
in 1995 as a member of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. 
I have chosen this case because the majority opinion and 
dissent illustrate many of Justice Cardozo’s insights about judicial 
decision-making from his four lectures in 1921 on “The Nature of the 
Judicial Process.”1  Reflecting on his experience on the New York 
Court of Appeals, Cardozo wrote that most of the cases that come 
before his court “could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in 
any way but one.  The law and its application alike are plain.”2  Then 
there are the cases that inspired Cardozo’s lectures, where “[t]here are 
gaps to be filled. There are doubts and ambiguities to be cleared. There 
are hardships and wrongs to be mitigated if not avoided.”3  For me, 
Dasha v. Maine Medical Center4 was one of those cases. 
 
*I wish to thank my talented law clerk, Nicholas Meyers, for his valuable help in preparing 
this essay. 
1 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) [hereinafter 
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS]. [Note: page numbers in brackets indicate page numbers in the 
2010 paperback edition]. 
2 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 164 [105].   
3 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 14 [4]. 
4 Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 993, 995 (Me. 1995). 
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I. 
Joseph Dasha was an Army veteran who earned his living by 
writing complex technical manuals, largely for the Navy.  After 
experiencing seizures for a number of years, he had an MRI performed 
in Maine in 1988 that disclosed a brain tumor.  Dasha was then 56 
years old.5 
In June 1988, Dasha underwent surgery at the Maine Medical 
Center in Portland to remove the tumor.  The surgeon’s findings -- that 
the tumor was round, smooth and came out easily6 -- suggested a 
benign tumor.  To the surgeon’s surprise, however, a pathologist at 
Maine Medical Center diagnosed the tumor as an aggressive and fatal 
form of cancer.7  Dasha was advised to undergo a series of radiation 
treatments of his brain to prolong his life.8  Without treatment he might 
survive six months.  With treatment he could survive eighteen months 
to two years.9  During July and August of that year, Dasha had 
approximately thirty high-dosage radiation treatments.10  On August 1, 
while he was receiving the radiation treatments in Portland, a 
neuropathologist at the New England Medical Center in Boston 
confirmed the diagnosis of Dasha’s fatal tumor.11 
In September, in need of care, Dasha moved from his home in 
Scarborough, Maine to Needham, Massachusetts to live with his sister 
Margaret.12  There, he experienced a steady decline in his capacities 
because of severe brain damage from the radiation treatments.13  He 
could not walk or sit and he became incontinent.  He developed poor 
memory and had difficulty speaking.14  On March 2, 1989, Dasha 
executed a power of attorney in favor of his sister.15  The parties agreed 
 
5 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file 
with author). 
6 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file 
with author). 
7 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file 
with author). 
8 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 994. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Dasha v. Adelman, 699 N.E.2d 20, 21 (Mass. App. 1998). 
13 Id. 
14 Dasha vs. Maine Med. Ctr., D. Me., No. CIV. 93-343-P-C, 1994 WL 371464 (July 8, 
1994). 
15 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 994.  
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that he was mentally incompetent by that point.16  In November 1990, 
a doctor at Newton-Wellesley Hospital, surprised that Dasha was 
doing better physically than the initial diagnosis of a fatal tumor had 
predicted, asked the New England Medical Center neuropathologist 
who had confirmed that diagnosis to review Dasha’s tissue samples 
again.17  After doing so, the neuropathologist revised his diagnosis and 
concluded that Dasha’s tumor was relatively benign and had a 
favorable prognosis.18 
In March 1991, approximately two years and nine months after 
the misdiagnosis by the pathologist at Maine Medical Center, Margaret 
Dasha was informed of the error.  She subsequently notified Maine 
Medical Center that she intended to file a lawsuit against Maine 
Medical Center on her brother’s behalf in federal court in Portland.19  
At that point, three years and eleven months had passed since the 
misdiagnosis.20  In response to the lawsuit, Maine Medical Center 
asserted the statute of limitations as a defense.  Maine law requires that 
actions for professional negligence “be commenced within 3 years 
after the cause of action accrues.”21  The statute further specifies that 
“a cause of action accrues on the date of the act or omission giving rise 
to the injury.”22  In choosing that definition of accrual, the Maine 
legislature abrogated the more generous discovery rule that the Maine 
Supreme Court, in the absence of a statutory definition of accrual, had 
adopted for medical malpractice actions.23  With a discovery rule, a 
cause of action does not accrue, that is, the commencement of the 
statute of limitations is tolled, until a plaintiff reasonably could know 
of the harm he suffered. 
The parties agreed that Dasha’s action was not filed within 
three years of the date of the misdiagnosis, the date of accrual.24  Dasha 
contended, however, that Maine Medical Center should be equitably 
 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 The filing of this notice tolls the statute of limitations if it has not already expired. See 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2859 (2018).  The actual lawsuit does not need to be filed for 
this purpose.   
20 This narrative has included many dates.  To help the reader understand the chronology, I 
have added an appendix detailing the relevant dates.   
21 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2902 (2018). 
22 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2902 (2018). 
23 See Choroszy v. Tso, 647 A.2d 803, 806 (Me. 1994) (discussing legislative history of 
P.L.1985, ch. 804). 
24 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 994. 
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estopped, that is, barred, from raising the statute of limitations as a 
defense because the unnecessary radiation treatments caused by its 
misdiagnosis had made him incapable of understanding and asserting 
his legal rights after March 2, 1989, the agreed upon date of his mental 
incompetence.25  That date was almost nine months after the 
misdiagnosis by Maine Medical Center, and approximately two years 
and three months before the expiration of the statute of limitations.  
During that two years and three months, given his inability to 
understand and assert his legal rights, Dasha did not have the capacity 
to file a malpractice action before the expiration of the statute of 
limitations. It would be unfair to allow Maine Medical Center to 
benefit from its own wrongdoing under that circumstance. 
On the basis of agreed upon facts, the federal court in Portland 
reviewed Maine’s law of equitable estoppel and concluded that its 
applicability to Dasha’s case was uncertain.26  Traditionally, equitable 
estoppel applies when a plaintiff can show that he filed a lawsuit 
beyond the statute of limitations period because he relied on some 
misrepresentation by the defendant subsequent to the negligent act.27  
In Dasha’s case, there was no subsequent misrepresentation.  Maine 
Medical Center’s negligent act itself -- the misdiagnosis which led to 
his mental incompetence -- deprived Dasha of the ability to protect 
himself during a substantial portion of the statute of limitations period.  
Aware of this unusual circumstance, the federal court asked the Maine 
Supreme Court to decide whether Dasha should be allowed to invoke 
Maine’s doctrine of equitable estoppel.28  
In addressing that question, my colleagues cited language from 
our precedents stating that equitable estoppel “is a doctrine that should 
be carefully and sparingly applied.”29  Then, turning to the record, and 
taking the traditional view of equitable estoppel, the majority saw the 
negligent diagnosis of Maine Medical Center as irrelevant to the 
 
25 Id.  
26 Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., CIV. 93-343-P-C, 1994 WL 371464, at *1 (D. Me. July 8, 
1994). 
27 See Anderson v. Commissioner of Dept. of Human Servs., 489 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Me. 
1985); but see Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 375 A.2d 534, 539 (Me. 1977) (holding that 
a claim of equitable estoppel can be supported by an act of negligence that is the equivalent of 
fraud). 
28 Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., CIV. 93-343-P-C, 1994 WL 371464, at *3 (D. Me. July 8, 
1994). 
29 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 995 (quoting Vacuum Sys., Inc. v. Bridge Const. Co., 632 A.2d 442, 
444 (Me. 1993)). 
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applicability of equitable estoppel to Dasha’s claim. Instead, the 
majority focused on the hospital’s conduct after the misdiagnosis.30  
Did Dasha detrimentally rely on any misrepresentation by Maine 
Medical Center that induced him to run afoul of the statute of 
limitations, such as “Don’t worry.  We will take care of you,” or “You 
have plenty of time to file your lawsuit?” 
Answering that question “no,” the majority wrote that “Dasha 
relied on the misdiagnosis to seek radiation treatments, but he did not 
rely on a misrepresentation of MMC to decide to forego legal 
redress.”31  In the absence of this traditional element, the majority 
concluded that Dasha’s claim against Maine Medical Center was 
barred by the statute of limitations.32 
In my view, however, the detrimental reliance required by 
equitable estoppel was present in Dasha’s case, but it took a different, 
more lethal form.  As I wrote in my dissent:  “MMC’s conduct 
effectively prevented Dasha from filing a timely cause of action in a 
manner far more devastating than fraud.  The conduct of MMC made 
Dasha incompetent and unable even to understand that he had a cause 
of action.”33  Hence, unlike the majority, I would have advised the 
 
30 Id. at 994. 
31 Id. at 995. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 997 (Lipez, J., dissenting).  I noted in my dissent that Dasha had executed a power 
of attorney in favor of Margaret in March 1989, prior to the expiration of the three-year statute 
of limitations.  She also learned of the Maine Medical Center diagnosis several months prior 
to the expiration of the statute of limitations.  In my view, those facts did not preclude 
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel: 
In equitable tolling cases, the existence of a power of attorney conferred 
by a person before the onset of incapacity does not preclude application 
of the tolling statute: 
The aim of the tolling statute is “to relieve from the strict time 
restrictions any person who actually lacks the ability and 
capacity, due to mental affliction, to pursue his lawful    rights. . . 
.” (citations omitted)  The statute does not condition tolling on 
the absence of others who may be legally authorized to act for 
the insane person. 
Kisselbach v. County of Camden, 271 N.J. Super. 558, 638 A.2d 1383, 
1387 (1994).  That same principle should apply to this equitable estoppel 
case.  The power of attorney conferred on Margaret Dasha the authority 
to sue when she learned of the misdiagnosis approximately two years and 
nine months after it occurred, not the obligation to do so.  Id. 
Dasha, 665 A.2d at 997 n.3 (Lipez, J., dissenting). Consistent with this view, the majority did 
not rely on the existence of the power of attorney in concluding that Dasha could not invoke 
equitable estoppel as a bar to the statute of limitations. 
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federal court that Dasha could invoke equitable estoppel as a bar to the 
statute of limitations. 
II. 
Looking back on these competing opinions, I now realize that 
my colleagues and I had engaged, unwittingly, in a decision-making 
process that reveals the continuing relevance of Cardozo’s lectures on 
the judicial process.34 
To begin, Cardozo captured my predicament in Dasha                   
when he described the “anxious judge” with a “semi-intuitive 
apprehension” that a decision against Dasha would be contrary to “the 
pervading spirit of our law.”35  On such egregious facts, how could we 
close the courthouse door to him?  Yet I knew that anxiety and 
apprehension were no substitute for analysis.  My colleagues and I had 
to begin our analysis of Dasha’s claim where we must always begin -- 
with the precedents. 
Cardozo insisted on the importance of stare decisis. 
“Adherence to precedent,” he said, “must . . . be the rule rather than 
the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed 
administration of justice in the court.”36  These precedents  
fix the point of departure from which the labor of the 
judge begins.  Almost invariably, his first step is to 
examine and compare them. If they are plain and to the 
point, there may be need of nothing more.  Stare decisis 
is at least the everyday working rule of our law.37 
My colleagues in Dasha were faithful to this principle.  They 
found the leading cases in Maine on equitable estoppel, noted the 
elements of the doctrine, applied them to the undisputed facts in 
Dasha’s case, found the necessary elements missing, and concluded 
that our precedents were “plain and to the point,” with “need of nothing 
 
34 Although I criticize the majority opinion of my colleagues, as I did in my dissent, I have 
the utmost respect for them.  I have the advantage here of an unchallenged elaboration of my 
position.  Given the opportunity, I know that my colleagues could offer a thoughtful 
elaboration of their position. 
35 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 43 [23]. 
36 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 34 [17]. 
37 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20 [8]. 
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more.”38  It was clear to them that Dasha could not invoke equitable 
estoppel to save his claim. 
In taking that approach, however, my colleagues ignored 
Cardozo’s warning that a “process of search [for precedents], 
comparison and little more”39 was misguided.  It was not enough “to 
match the colors of the case at hand against the colors of many sample 
cases spread out upon their desk,”40 with “the sample nearest in shade 
suppl[ying] the applicable rule . . .  [N]o system of living law can be 
evolved by such a process . . .  It is when the colors do not match . . . 
that the serious business of the judge begins.”41  Although the colors 
of our cases on equitable estoppel did not match Dasha’s case, we were 
in the realm of equity, where we had some license to depart from 
precedents that did not fill what Cardozo describes as “gaps” or 
“interstices” in the law. 
Still, as Cardozo reminds us, and Cardozo always reminds us 
of countervailing principles, there are constraints on that license.  In 
deciding the immediate case, we are fashioning law for the cases that 
will follow.42  We must remember, as Cardozo puts it, that “[t]he 
sentence of today will make the right and wrong of tomorrow.”43 
Also, where statutes are in play, there must be respect for 
legislative judgment.  “The rule that fits the case may be supplied by 
the constitution or by statute,” Cardozo writes.  “If that is so, the judge 
looks no further.  The correspondence ascertained, his duty is to 
obey.”44  But that correspondence is elusive when judges must 
determine legislative intent from uncertain words, or determine 
whether the community’s “sense of law and order”45 precludes 
application of a statute of clear meaning to an unforeseen and 
unsettling circumstance. 
Dasha’s case did not require us to determine legislative intent 
from ambiguous words.  There was no ambiguity in the meaning of the 
statute of limitations, which said clearly that actions for professional 
negligence had to “be commenced within 3 years after the cause of 
 
38 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20 [8]. 
39 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20 [8]. 
40 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20 [8]. 
41 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20-21 [8-9]. 
42 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 21 [9]. 
43 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 21 [9]. 
44 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 14 [4]. 
45 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 14 [4]. 
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action accrues.”46 Dasha involved a different kind of gap in the law -- 
the uncertain relationship between the legislatively determined statute 
of limitations and the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel, 
created by judges to bar the application of rules, including statutes, 
under circumstances that might offend the community’s “sense of law 
and order,” and, as such, in the case of statutes, be contrary to 
legislative intent. 
That inquiry in Dasha was particularly complicated because of 
the statutory language providing that “a cause of action accrues on the 
date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury.”47  As noted earlier, 
the Maine legislature, in choosing that accrual language, eliminated the 
judicially created discovery rule for medical malpractice actions.  
However, the Legislature left in place the discovery rule for “foreign 
object surgical cases.”  It also did not disturb the tolling provisions for 
claims brought by plaintiffs who were “minors, . . . mentally ill, 
imprisoned or without the limits of the United States” when their cause 
of action accrued.48  The parties agreed that Dasha was “competent at 
the time of the misdiagnosis and during the radiation treatment.”49  So 
one could argue that Dasha was, in effect, asking the judges, in direct 
contravention of the legislative judgment, to create a further exception 
to the abrogation of the discovery rule for those cases in which an 
individual, after the act of malpractice, became incompetent during the 
statute of limitations period. 
If that was a fair view of Dasha’s argument, Cardozo would say 
that “the correspondence ascertained,” it was the duty of the judges to 
obey.”50  The Legislature had explicitly decided which exceptions 
would survive its elimination of the discovery rule for medical 
malpractice cases.  But neither I nor the majority felt that it was fair to 
view Dasha’s equitable estoppel argument as, in effect, an equitable 
tolling argument designed to undermine the Legislature’s judgment on 
the discovery rule.  Equitable tolling focuses on the circumstances of 
a plaintiff, such as minority status or mental illness.  Those 
circumstances make it unfair to allow the statute of limitations to run 
 
46 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2902 (2018). 
47 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2902 (2018). 
48 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 996 (discussing legislative history of statute of limitations in medical 
malpractice actions); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 853 (2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 24, §2902 (2018). 
49 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 994-95. 
50 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 14 [4]. 
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when a plaintiff cannot reasonably discover what has happened to him.  
In equitable estoppel cases, on the other hand, the focus is on the 
conduct of the defendant.  Did the defendant behave in a way towards 
the plaintiff that would make it unfair to allow the defendant to raise 
an expired statute of limitations as a defense?  In my view, and the 
majority’s, Maine’s statute of limitations for malpractice cases did not 
preclude consideration of Dasha’s equitable estoppel argument.  
Rather, the question we had to answer was how that common law 
doctrine should evolve in the face of a difficult case like Dasha’s.  That 
is the “serious business of judging”51 to which Cardozo devotes his 
lectures. 
III. 
Cardozo famously writes that judges may use four methods to 
evaluate “the directive force of a principle”52 such as equitable 
estoppel.  They are: 
First, the line of logical progression, which he called the 
rule of analogy or the method of philosophy;53 
 
Second, the line of historical development, which he 
called the method of evolution;54 
 
Third, the line of the customs of the community, which 
he called the method of tradition;55 and 
 
Fourth, the lines of justice, morals and social welfare, 
which he called the method of sociology.56 
Cardozo is not suggesting that these four methods are relevant to every 
case requiring judges to fill a gap in the law.  Their relevance will 
depend on the nature of the case.  For example, when he writes of 
custom, Cardozo refers to the application of old rules of commerce to 
the new realms “of steam and electricity, the railroad and the 
 
51 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 20-21 [8-9]. 
52 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 30-31 [15]. 
53 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 30 [15]. 
54 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 30-31 [15]. 
55 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 30-31 [15]. 
56 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 30-31 [15]. 
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steamship, the telegraph and the telephone.”57  These realms of 
commerce are far removed from the world of medical care.  There, the 
methods of philosophy, history and sociology are relevant to the 
directive force of the principle of equitable estoppel in a malpractice 
case. 
Cardozo places “the rule of analogy or the method of 
philosophy” first among his principles of selection because it has, he 
says, “a certain presumption in its favor . . . .  It has the primacy that 
comes from natural and orderly and logical succession.”58  In Dasha, I 
used the rule of analogy.  The majority had emphasized the traditional 
requirement of equitable estoppel that a plaintiff must detrimentally 
rely on a fraudulent or negligent representation by the defendant, 
subsequent to the negligent conduct, in foregoing a legal action that he 
had intended to pursue.59 Dasha had shown no such reliance.  In my 
dissent, I said there was a fair analogy between that traditional 
detrimental reliance requirement and Dasha’s reliance on the negligent 
misdiagnosis of Maine Medical Center to submit to the massive 
radiation treatments that made him incompetent and unable to seek 
timely redress during a substantial portion of the statute of limitations 
period.60   I saw in that analogy the “natural and orderly and logical 
succession” of equitable estoppel.61 
The method of history also supported the application of 
equitable estoppel to Dasha’s case.  True, Cardozo relates the method 
of history to such heavily rule-based areas of the law as real estate or 
contracts.  There, he says, the conceptions 
embody the thought, not so much of the present as of 
the past, that separated from the past their form and 
meaning are unintelligible and arbitrary, and hence that 
their development, in order to be truly logical, must be 
mindful of their origins.62 
But Cardozo’s point -- that mindfulness of the origins of a doctrine 
may support its logical development -- has broad applicability.  In its 
original formulation in Maine, equitable estoppel was notable for its 
 
57 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 62 [36]. 
58 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 31 [15-16]. 
59 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 995.  
60 Id. at 997 (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
61 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 31 [15-16]. 
62 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 56 [32]. 
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flexibility.  As the Maine Supreme Court wrote in 1893, equitable 
estoppel developed in the Chancery Courts of England to ameliorate 
the inflexible rules of the common law courts.63  Hence, the court said, 
it should not “be confined within the limits of any technical definition 
or formula which excludes all cases not within its terms, but . . . it is 
entitled to a fair and liberal application for the promotion of honesty 
and fair dealing.”64 
Somehow, that capacious doctrine had been narrowed by the 
Maine Supreme Court in the ways noted by the majority in Dasha.  
Instead of a fair and liberal application, the doctrine “should [now] be 
‘carefully and sparingly’ applied.”65  Instead of being free of any 
formula, the doctrine now required a misrepresentation by a defendant, 
subsequent to the negligent act causing injury, that induced a plaintiff 
to forego his intended legal action.  The analogy that I advanced in my 
dissent, comparing Maine Medical Center’s misdiagnosis to a 
misrepresentation by the hospital, was consistent with the original 
formulation of the doctrine in Maine.  We were free, as a later 
incarnation of the Supreme Court, to return to that more flexible and 
just version of equitable estoppel. 
To be sure, as Cardozo warned, such a return would have 
consequences for future cases involving equitable estoppel.  My 
approach would have conflated, for the first time in Maine law, the 
misrepresentation about an available legal remedy and the negligent 
act itself.  On the other hand, how often would the negligence of a party 
justify that conflation by destroying the competence of the injured 
party?  Not often.  If my position had prevailed, the breach in the wall 
of finality for medical malpractice cases would have been slight. 
Then, finally, there is the method of sociology, described by 
Cardozo as “the force which in our day and generation is becoming the 
greatest of them all.”66  Cardozo explicitly links the method of 
sociology to constitutional cases with their great generalities, such as 
liberty and due process.  In those cases, “[t]he method of sociology in 
filling the gaps, puts its emphasis on the social order.”67  He adds that 
“[t]he old forms remain, but they are filled with a new content . . . .  
 
63 Hallowell Nat. Bank v. Marston, 85 Me. 488, 27 A. 529, 531 (1893). 
64 Id. 
65 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 995 (quoting Vacuum Sys., Inc. v. Bridge Const. Co., 632 A.2d 442, 
444 (Me. 1993)). 
66 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 65-66 [38]. 
67 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 71 [42]. 
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We are thinking of the end which the law serves, and fitting its rules to 
the task of service.”68  
Yet Cardozo insists that the method of sociology should also 
be applied to private law, even though “considerations of social utility 
are not so aggressive and insistent.”69  There, too, judges must be 
prepared to alter the formal application of a rule to serve the ends of 
justice.  To demonstrate that point, Cardozo cites the famous case of 
Riggs v. Palmer,70 which required the New York Court of Appeals to 
decide in 1889 if a sixteen-year-old boy who murdered his grandfather 
to prevent his disinheritance could still claim property under the will.  
Although the probate statutes, literally applied, did not permit the court 
to alter the terms of the will, the court refused to apply the statutes as 
written.  Instead, the court posed this question:  “If the lawmakers 
could, as to this case, be consulted, would they say that they intended 
by their general language that the property of . . . an ancestor should 
pass on to one who had taken his life for the express purpose of getting 
his property?”71   In answering that question “no,” Cardozo says the 
court chose a principle “that was thought to be most fundamental, to 
represent the larger and deeper social interests.”72  It was the principle 
that “no man should profit from his . . . own wrong.”73 
I invoked this same “deeply rooted maxim”74 in my dissent in 
Dasha.  It is the principle at the heart of the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel, and it is the principle that captures the unsettling injustice of 
the Dasha case.  It is also the principle that prompted me to ask in my 
dissent in Dasha the same question that the New York Court of 
Appeals asked in Riggs v. Palmer.75  Could the Maine legislature have 
intended such an unjust result?  I did not think so. 
Implicit in any statute of limitations [I wrote] . . . is the 
notion that an individual subject to the statute has the 
capacity for self-protection.  Even in cases of medical 
misdiagnosis, the misdiagnosed patient at least has the 
 
68 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 101-02 [63]. 
69 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 150-51 [96]. 
70 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
71 Id. at 189. 
72 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 40-42 [21-22]. 
73 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 41-42 [22]. 
74 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 998 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (quoting Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. 
Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959)). 
75 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
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capacity to seek a second opinion or to act upon 
symptoms that remain troublesome.  That capacity for 
self-protection arguably moderates the harshness of the 
rule that begins the limitations period with the act of 
misdiagnosis.76 
In Dasha’s case, however, that “capacity for any degree of self-
protection within the statute of limitations period was destroyed by the 
very party from whom he [sought] redress.”77  As noted, equitable 
estoppel, unlike equitable tolling, focuses on the conduct of the party 
who has committed the wrongful act.  Although the legislature may 
have spoken unequivocally on the availability of equitable tolling to 
bar the application of the statute of limitations, it had never spoken on 
the availability of equitable estoppel.  Under that circumstance, to use 
Cardozo’s language, we could have reasonably concluded that the 
Maine legislature would not want the statute of limitations to bar 
Dasha’s claim when that outcome would offend the community’s 
“sense of law and order.”78 
I must acknowledge, however, that this application of the 
method of sociology in Dasha was relatively easy because of the 
congruence between my “anxiety” about the case and the equitable 
maxim that “no man should profit from his . . . own wrong.”79  My 
dissent had some grounding in familiar law.  I did not feel that I was 
imposing my personal sense of justice.  But there will be cases where 
the judge’s anxiety does not match a familiar equitable maxim.  How 
useful will the method of sociology be then? 
Cardozo’s answer is vague, perhaps inescapably so.  He 
acknowledges that judges “cannot escape” the “empire” of 
“subconscious loyalties” “any more than other mortals.”80  Yet he 
believes that the wise judge, and Cardozo bets heavily on the wise 
 
76 Dasha, 665 A.2d at 998 (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
77 Id. (Lipez, J., dissenting).  I acknowledge that I overstated this point somewhat in my 
dissent.  Maine Medical Center did not destroy Dasha’s capacity for self-protection for the 
entirety of the statute of limitations period.  As noted, he was competent at the time of the 
misdiagnosis and at the time he received the radiation treatments.  Those treatments triggered 
a process of mental deterioration that destroyed his competence by March 1989, two years and 
nine months before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations.  It would be more 
accurate to say that Maine Medical Center destroyed his capacity for self-protection for a 
substantial portion of the statute of limitations period. 
78 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 16 [5]. 
79 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 41-42 [22]. 
80 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 16 [5]. 
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judge, will engage in a process of creation that harmonizes the personal 
with deeply rooted principles and traditions.  Observing that “[w]e are 
tending more and more toward an appreciation of the truth that, after 
all, there are few rules; there are chiefly standards and degrees,”81  
Cardozo describes the wise judge at work: 
[T]he duty of a judge becomes itself a question of 
degree, and he is a useful judge or a poor one as he 
estimates the measure accurately or loosely.  He must 
balance all those ingredients, his philosophy, his logic, 
his analogies, his history, his customs, his sense of 
right, and all the rest, and adding a little here and taking 
out a little there, must determine, as wisely as he can, 
which weight shall tip the scales.82 
Although Cardozo acknowledges that this description of the 
wise judge may seem “a weak and inconclusive summary,”83 he argues 
that “the like criticism may be made of most attempts to formulate the 
principles which regulate the practice of an art.”84    Ultimately, every 
judge must find his or her own way in the art of judging.  As he puts 
it: 
After the wearisome process of analysis has been 
finished, there must be for every judge a new synthesis 
which he will have to make for himself.  The most that 
he can hope for is that with long thought and study, with 
years of practice at the bar or on the bench, and with the 
aid of that inward grace which comes now and again to 
the elect of any calling, the analysis may help a little to 
make the synthesis a true one.85 
Cardozo knows that he is too modest about his achievement.  
Using his methods of reasoning in those difficult cases requiring “the 
creative or dynamic element”86 of judging, even those judges who are 
not among the elect of their calling can reach the true synthesis that 
permits the law to evolve sensibly and humanely.  Far from a 
wearisome analysis, Cardozo’s brilliant lectures on the judicial process 
 
81 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 161 [103]. 
82 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 161-62 [103-04]. 
83 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 162 [104]. 
84 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 162 [104]. 
85 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 162-63 [104]. 
86 CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 164 [106]. 
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are a timeless gift for judges who must inescapably fill the gaps in the 
law. 
EPILOGUE 
I must finish the story of Joseph Dasha.  Prior to filing the 
action in Maine against Maine Medical Center, Margaret Dasha had 
filed on Joseph’s behalf a malpractice action in the Superior Court of 
Massachusetts against the New England Medical Center pathologist 
who, like the Maine Medical Center pathologist, had misdiagnosed 
Joseph’s tumor.87  After several twists and turns in the courts of 
Massachusetts,88 that lawsuit led to a modest settlement.  Joseph was 
already well into his radiation treatments as a result of the Maine 
misdiagnosis when the New England pathologist also misread his 
slides.89  At that point, even a correct diagnosis might not have 
prevented much of the damage to Joseph’s brain. 
Still, there was enough money in the settlement to fund a trust 
for Joseph’s care.  Margaret placed him in a good nursing home in 
Needham, where she hired a nurse to supplement his care four hours a 
day.90  She bought a van with a hydraulic lift so that she and the nurse 
could lift Joseph’s wheelchair into the van and take him to dentist 
appointments, to visit his old neighborhood in Needham, and to see the 
Christmas lights of Boston.  He always seemed to enjoy those 
outings.91 
Joseph died on April 2, 2004 at the age of 72, almost 16 years 
after the misdiagnosis of his brain tumor in 1988.  At that time, with 
the “benefit” of radiation treatment, he was told that he might live two 
years.  He deserved better. 
  
 
87 See Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 93-3856-G, 1996 WL 365995, at *1 (Mass. Super. June 
25, 1996).  
88 See id.; Dasha v Adelman, 699 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. App. 1998). 
89 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file 
with author). 
90 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file 
with author). 
91 E-mail from Terry Garmey, counsel for Joseph Dasha, to author (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file 
with author). 
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APPENDIX 
 
 June 13, 1988:  A pathologist at Maine Medical Center diagnoses 
Joseph Dasha with a fatal brain tumor. 
 
 July 5, 1988:  Joseph Dasha begins radiation treatments. 
 
 August 1, 1988:  A neuropathologist at the New England Medical 
Center confirms Maine Medical Center’s diagnosis. 
 
 August 16, 1988:  Joseph Dasha receives final radiation treatment.  
 
 March 2, 1989:  Joseph Dasha executes a power of attorney in 
favor of his sister, Margaret Dasha.  The parties agree that Dasha 
was mentally incompetent at this point, which is nine months after 
the misdiagnosis by Maine Medical Center, and two years and 
three months before the expiration of the statute of limitations.   
 
 November 1990:  A doctor at the Newton-Wellesley Hospital asks 
the New England Medical Center neuropathologist to review again 
tissue samples from Dasha’s brain tumor.  
 
 March 1, 1991: Margaret Dasha is informed that the 
neuropathologist has revised his earlier diagnosis, now identifying 
the tumor as relatively benign.  She received this information two 
years and nine months after the misdiagnosis.  
 
 May 9, 1992: Margaret Dasha notifies Maine Medical Center of 
her intent to file a lawsuit on behalf of her brother, three years and 
eleven months after the misdiagnosis. 
 
 July 22, 1992: Josepha Dasha is declared legally incompetent and 
Margaret Dasha is appointed as his legal guardian. 
 
 December 8, 1993: Margaret Dasha files suit against Maine 
Medical Center in federal district court in Portland.  
 
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/15
